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Abstrak:Tulisan ini membahas tiga tema utama: feminisme, Islam dan 
modernitas. Islam telah lebih dahulu mengakui keberadaan 
hak-hak wanita. Al-Qur‟an itu sendiri bersifat egaliter. Hanya 
bangsa Barat-lah yang sering salah menginterpretasikan dan 
merepresentasikan Islam karena kurangnya pengetahuan 
mereka tentang Islam, kebodohan, dan kebingugan mereka 
antara Islam aktual dengan kebudayaan Arab. Dengan melihat 
argumen-argumen tentang modernitas, feminisme, dan Islam 
dari sejumlah suara: filosof, pemuka kritik sosial, dan kaum 
feminis baik dari poros Islam maupun dari pandangan Barat, 
tulisan ini mengambil kesimpulan bahwa feminisme, Islam dan 
modernitas dapat berjalan seirama asal ketiga aspek ini 
dilakukan menurut etika positip, saling memahami dan adanya 
praktek kebesasan yang seimbang. 
 
Kata Kunci: Feminisme, Islam, Modernitas         
 
Islam as it is often condemned for oppression of women has 
become one of the central themes in the Western academia and even in 
the media. Dozens of books and hundreds of journal articles dealing 
with the issue have been written by both Muslims and non-Muslims 
alike. Many Muslim writers, particularly the Islamic feminists have put 
forwards a lot of arguments that the treatment of women in Islam have 
to be revisited, reinterpreted because the Qur‟an itself as the original 
source of knowledge and moral codes for Muslims is inherently 
egalitarian. Some feminist thinkers argue that in classical Islam there 
was freedom of practices such as Sufism, which had played a major 
role in shaping the behavior of each gender without being dominated. 
Others argue that Muslims should not look at the classical history of 
Islam in relation to the gender system for modern life because it no 
longer fixes the order of current social, political and economic situations. 
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Today there are Muslim women who have good education and have 
proven that they can do what men can. 
There are also both Muslim and non-Muslim scholars who argue 
that the treatment of women in Islam should be solved according to the 
concept of modern, secular liberation of women as it has been 
cultivated in the West, in which the power relations are negotiated 
though reason. They suggest that the moral system should consist of 
moral codes and ethos, although not all scholars have the same opinion 
about the demarcation between the divine law and ethics. While some 
scholars place more space on the moral code, others tend to argue that 
ethics should be taken into account as a better choice of guide in 
modern life. 
In this paper I will try to revisit the concept of feminism and 
modernity, principally in the context of Islam as it has been debated on 
by some philosophers, politicians and feminist thinkers. I divide the 
paper into five sections. In the first section, I will provide the target of 
the philosopher Seyla Benhabib‟s critique of strong multiculturalism and 
her proposal of deliberative democracy in relation to the concept of 
cross-cultural dialogue and ethical universalism. In the second section, I 
will deal with the critique of Candra Talpade Mohanty and Saba 
Mahmood on Western feminism and try to relate it to Benhabib‟s 
framework of deliberative democracy. This section will also discuss 
Mahmood‟s use of the concepts of the later Foucault in her study of the 
Egyptian women‟s mosque movement. Then in the third section, I will 
explain the way the later Foucault‟s concept as it is interpreted by Karen 
Vintges in relation to the issue of multiculturalism and feminism. Also, in 
this section I will refer to the documentary Divorce Iranian Style to 
discuss the usefulness of the later Foucault‟s concepts. In the fourth 
section, I will discuss Nilüfer Göle‟s approaches to the issues of veiling 
and modernity. In the fifth and final sections, I will deal with Leila 
Ahmed‟s approach to the issue of feminism and Islam and compare it 
with Amina Wadud‟s proposal of reinterpretation of the Qur‟an in 
relation to the issue. Finally, I will put forward some arguments about 
the possibility of an Islamic feminism by providing several cases from 
classical Islam and Mariam Cooke‟s examples of modern Islamic 
feminists. 
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Section 1 
  
 In this first section I will deal with Benhabib‟s critique of 
multiculturalism and her proposal of the interface between 
multiculturalism and ethical universalism with the expected outcome 
called deliberative democracy. 
Seyla Benhabib in The Claims of Culture (2002) criticizes the 
theory of multiculturalism such as of Will Kimlicka. She argues that 
strong multiculturalism is impossible because cultures should not be 
reified but negotiated through cross-cultural dialogue, mutual learning 
and deliberative democracy. Cultures and societies are not holistic but 
polyvocal, multilayered and decentered. At the same time she also 
challenges the concept of linguistic relativism such as of Jean-Francois 
Lyotard. Benhabib‟s argument is based the principle that although 
human beings are all the same everywhere (they need clothes to wear, 
food to eat and shelter to live in), there are certain principles that we 
cannot make judgments. Strong multiculturalism is, thus, at stake. For 
example, the right of women, children and minorities within minorities 
are disobeyed. This is because people‟s lives are embedded in their 
cultures, which cannot clearly be defined as holistic, as many cultural 
theorists have assumed. Much debate about multiculturalism, in which 
cultures are conceived as different phenomena, Benhabib argues, is 
false. The view that strong multiculturalism is possible does not allow us 
to take into account “the complexity of global civilization dialogues and 
encounters, which are increasingly our lot, and it has encouraged the 
binaries of “we” and “the other(s)” (Benhabib, 2002: 25).  According to 
Benhabib, universalism is a form of ethnocentrism, namely, “They” have 
to follow “Us.” But many rationalists do not take into account that 
agreement on truth, values and norms is not always universal. Thus 
universalism should not only cover the relative cognitive inquiry, but it 
also must have moral meaning. Searching for a new paradigm, 
Benhabib presents an alternative approach, developing an 
understanding of cultures as continually creating, recreating and 
negotiating the undesired boundaries between “Us” and “Them.” She 
points out “all human beings, regardless of race, gender, sexual 
preference, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious background, are to 
be considered moral equals and are therefore to be created as equally 
entitled to moral respect” (Benhabib, 2002: 27, my italic). 
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Benhabib opposes universalism and linguistic relativism, 
because universalism benefits a majority group, but hurts others such 
as the minorities, women and children. She also criticizes the relative 
philosophical thought of being limited and embedded in language. She 
instead proposes the integration between multiculturalism and ethical 
universalism, which can have philosophical and social dimensions.   
Using the contemporary cultural politics from Western Europe 
and the United States as an example, Benhabib puts forward a model of 
deliberative democracy1, a discussion based democracy, which is not 
based on representative of multiple voices, but which allows the cultural 
contestation within the public sphere and through social movements 
and the institutions of civil society. This model of democracy is nearly in 
line with Habermas‟ concept of rationality, namely, when there is a 
multicultural conflict, it is reason that decides- a procedural ethics. She 
concludes that institutional power sharing, legal pluralism and flexible 
citizenship are quite compatible with deliberative democracy. For 
instance, immigrants do not need to change their names when they 
arrive in a new country. To live together in deliberative democracy, 
there are normative principles that need to be obeyed: egalitarian 
reciprocity, voluntary self-ascription and freedom of exit and association 
(Benhabib, 2002: 148-149). Cross-cultural dialogue, intercultural 
political association and regional assemblies need to be included in 
policy making of the nation state. Through the standpoint of deliberative 
democracy, institutions through which the diverse communities 
negotiate can be created. The right of self-determination as the principle 
meanings of private sphere has to be interpreted as the right to 
                                                 
1
Benhabib‟s double-track model of deliberative democracy seems to be 
too optimistic, rather armed-chair theory of cultural diversity, unlikely feasible in 
the current modern society. Rationality is conceived a procedure, not based on 
rational subjects in general. Thus, the model she proposes does not seem to 
be cross-cultural enough. Consider, for example, the War on Terror in Iraq, 
does reason decide? There is no rationality, situated-self, or cross-cultural 
dialogue. No one has seen the dossier. Many museums and cultural heritage 
have been bombarded. Even though Saddam Husein has been hanged, no a 
single piece of weapons of mass destruction has been found. David Kelly 
eventually committed suicide because he felt losing face. It is only madness 
that is finally decisive. 
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participate in the larger community. Thus, mutual learning and tolerance 
should be the techniques of living in the modern world. 
 
Section 2 
 
 In the first section I provided the synopsis of Benhabib‟s The 
Claims of Culture. In this section, I have several objectives. First, I will 
discuss the critique of Mohanty and Mahmood on western feminism. 
Second, I will relate the critique of these two scholars to Benhabib‟s 
framework. Finally, I will explain Mahmood‟s use of later Foucault‟s 
concepts in her study of women‟s mosque movement. 
According to Mohanty (1991), Western feminist discourse has 
generalized the sexual difference in the West and places it similar to the 
women in the less developed world. As a result, the Western feminists 
strongly accuse male dominance of being oppressed to women in the 
third world such as the right to veil and reproduction. In addition, 
Mohanty also criticizes the Western feminists for their judgment of 
women as a coherent group across contexts, namely women in the third 
world are seen as powerless and dependent without looking at the 
history and the geography. Therefore, everything is judged according to 
the Western standard; women should be liberated, secular and having 
control over their own lives except the injustice of economy such as 
redistribution.2 The Western feminists represent the third world women 
as dependent, uneducated and oppressed. Briefly, it is through this 
Western humanist discourse that they misrepresent the third world 
women, yielding significant results, while having a political and colonial 
axe to grind and through which the Western power over the less 
developed world is exercised. 
Mohanty (1991)) also argues that the Western feminism has 
uncritically constituted the women of the less industrialized world as the 
monolithic subjects without taking into consideration the context in 
which these women are living. Writing from the classical Western 
                                                 
2
Many Western feminists have never fought for the rights of the social 
economy, education of the Third World women as they do for those of the 
West. What they usually do is attacking the attitude of Islam toward women 
such as polygamy, female circumcision and forced marriage. See e.g. Vintges 
(2004).  
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postmodernism, Mohanty argues that the historical specific approach is 
better than the Western model of feminism, which takes ahistorical 
study. Western liberation produces a homogenous model of feminism 
and it cannot totally be applied to Islam without bearing in mind the 
constitution of strategic coalitions across races, classes and national 
boundaries. The majority of Western writings on third world women, 
according to Mohanty, belong to parts of global colonial discourse, 
because they have moved beyond the goal of apolitical feminism, which 
can be applied to women in the whole world, not just in the West. 
In comparison with Mohanty‟s critique of Western feminism for 
victimizing the third world women, Mahmood (2001, 2005) argument 
departs slightly different from Mohanty‟s in that Mahmood‟s standpoint 
is that a free Western liberalism is a Western product. She suggests 
that being autonomous should not be limited to the Western humanist 
political judgment, instead it should be placed in the analytical 
framework in which agency is not linked to Western liberation, but in the 
context of positive freedom emerging from “the capacity for self-mastery 
and self-government” (Mahmood, 2005:11).3 That is, in order for a 
woman to be a free individual, she has to determine her own behaviors, 
which  “must be the consequence of her “own will” rather than of 
custom, tradition, or social coercion” (Mahmood, 2005: 11: italic in 
original). It seems to me that Mahmood does not totally avoid the 
concept of Western humanism; instead she proposes a new way of 
approaching the similar problem, that is, there should be a practice of 
willingness to evaluate one‟s views in the light of others through a 
mutual learning.   
Both Mahanty and Mahmood‟s concepts of unraveling the 
cultural injustice in some Muslim countries such as Egypt are in line with 
Benhabib‟s proposal of cultural dialogue and deliberative democracy, in 
which everything including culture and even feeling is not reified but 
negotiated. This is due to the fact that culture is not fixed but 
intermingled. Thus the philosophical thought of dealing with equality and 
                                                 
3
There has been considerable debate about the notions positive and 
negative freedoms. For the liberal theory, see, for example, Simhony, Avital 
.1993. Beyond Negative and Positive Freedom: T.H. Green‟s View of Freedom. 
Political Theory, 2 (1): 28-54. Positive freedom in relation to Islamic Feminism, 
see Mahmood, Saba. 2005.  The Politics of Piety, pp. 118-152. 
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diversity in this modern era should be derived from mutual learning and 
cultural dialogue, not from a mere consensus of Western universalism, 
but from the point of departure of pluralistic enlightened ethical 
universalism, which places the cross-cultural dialogues as a crucial 
means of managing peaceful life in the modern world. 
In her study of the Egyptian women‟s mosque movement, 
Mahmood (2001, 2005) refers to Foucault‟s theory of ethics. According 
Foucault‟s analytical framework, there are four components of ethics, 
which can be applied for conceptualizing agency beyond the confines of 
the binary of enacting and subverting norms: substance of ethics, mode 
of subjectivation, techniques of the self and telos. In analyzing the 
ethics of women‟s mosque movement, Mahmood implemented the 
second and third aspects of Foucault‟s ethics, which recognize the 
moral obligations through divine law such as the existence of divine 
arrangements for human life represented in the Qur‟an and which deal 
with the operations one performs on oneself in order to produce an 
ethical subjects, which is philosophically often called “techniques of the 
self.” Figurer 1 schematically represents Foucault‟s concept of moral 
codes and ethics.      
 
Moral system 
 
 
 
Moral Codes 
 
 
 
 
 
Ethos 
 
Self technique 
 
Figure 1: Foucault‟s concept of moral codes and ethics 
 
Women‟s mosques movement is a nonliberal movement in 
which self-realization is aimed at “honing one‟s rational and emotional 
capacities so as to approximate the exemplary model of the pious self” 
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(Mahmood, 2005: 31). To manifest this technique of self-realization, the 
participants were ordered to perform their obligations through studying 
the divine text, interpreting the moral codes according to the traditional 
guideline and emphasizing the roles of religiosity-ritual practices 
including the way of dressing and speaking. Through practicing the 
ascetic practice, the mosque participants learn how to analyze the 
movements of the body and soul, which can balance the coordination 
between inner states and outer conducts. 
 
Section 3 
 
 In this section I will explain the later Foucault‟s philosophy in 
relation to the issue of multiculturalism and feminism as interpreted by 
Vintgest (2004). In addition, I will put forward my point of view on the 
effectiveness of the later Foucault‟s concept on the issue, particularly in 
relation to the system of leadership and marriage in Islamic context. 
Vintgest (2004) criticizes some Western thinkers such as Jurgen 
Habermas and Jacques Derrida of their postmodernist theories of the 
treatment of women, the abnormal, the senseless and the “strangers” 
as discredit subjects instead of their common identity as human beings. 
She argues that the later Foucault‟s concept of human subjects is more 
capacious and inclusive, treating the subject without binary boundaries. 
Her interpretation of the later Foucault‟s concept of ethics in dealing 
with multiculturalism and feminism is built upon the concept of practices 
of freedom as means of establishing “the care of the self” through self-
managing without conceiving the “original subject” or “deep self” as 
being autonomous according to the Western standard of rationality.  
Taking freedom of practices as a situated entity and freedom of 
practices for all, Vintges (2004) refers to Islamic Sufism as example of 
how practices of freedom via “technology of the self” can be manifested 
in human life without separating the system of gender; each has the 
freedom of conscience. She cites one case in Islamic Sufism of the 8th 
century female mystic Rabi‟ah al-Adawiyah, who lived a free life under 
no one‟s authority except submission to God alone. Vintges also refers 
to Foucault‟s concept practices of freedom in non-Western context as 
performed in other beliefs such as Zen Buddhism and Christian 
mysticism, which all provide us with insights that a new universal 
normative perspective across national, gender, and belief system is 
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possible as long as endorsing the practices of freedom is taken into 
consideration. Vintges interprets Foucault‟s ethics as a new way of 
living because “it is focused on the ethical-spiritual way of life, which is 
relatively autonomous in relation to moral codes and metaphysics; and 
it is new since it is democratic, contrary to the elitism of Greek ethics” 
(Vintges, 2004: 293). She adapts the Foucault‟s concept of ethics but 
revisits the demarcation between moral code and ethos.  
 
Moral system 
 
Practices of freedom 
 
Figure 2: Vintges‟ proposal of ethics built upon Foucauldian concept 
 
According to Vintges (2004), the ethos should have more space and the 
limit of moral code can be crossed, taking into consideration ethics as 
the art of living. Figurer 2 schematically represents Vintges‟ 
reinterpretation of Foucault‟s concept of ethics as art of living.4      
Through manifestation of practices of freedom for women in all 
cultures, including the Western one, Vintges argues that a cross-cultural 
feminism can be cultivated through a shared ethos or commitment 
without Truth. This is due to the new ethical concept of life as aiming at 
“the shaping of one‟s whole life” (Vintges, 2004: 293), in which the 
political, economic and social dominations are forced to stay in their 
lowest limits.  Vintges concludes that a new cross-cultural feminism 
does not impose the standards of Western secular liberalism, but seeks 
                                                 
4
See Foucault‟s concept of moral code and ethics on the previous 
page for comparison 
 
Moral Code 
 
 
 
Ethos 
 
Care of the 
Self 
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a truly universal norm through orienting itself to practices of freedom for 
all.There are certain situations where I myself find Foucault‟s analysis of 
ethics is helpful for understanding key aspects of life in Muslim society, 
for example, the concept of leadership and the system of marriage in 
which both women and men have the same rights. In Islam the role of 
human beings is the same for both sexes: Kullukum raa’in wa kullukum 
arraa’iyatin (Each of you is a leader and I will ask for your responsibility 
of your leadership). This statement indicates to us that in Islam there is 
the concept of “the care of the self” and the concept of “the care of the 
others” as long as the “the care of self” is not intended to bring about 
the domination, which can lead to an egoistical behavior when 
implemented in the society. It should be born in mind that in Islam “the 
care of the self” is for every one- both women and men- and “the care of 
the others” is also for all, meaning that it is not only “care of the self” 
that is prioritized but also “the care of the others.” This concept good of 
behavior is in line with the concept of ethics proposed by Foucault, 
when he responses to the questions in the interview “The care of the 
self is ethical in itself; but it implies complex relationships with others 
insofar as this ēthos of freedom is also a way of caring for others” 
(Foucault, 1997a: 287, italic in original). This suggests that one can 
occupy the position that she/he deserves in the community: a state 
leader, an army general, a university professor or what have you, at the 
same time she/he is an individual.    
  Another situation where the Foucault‟s concept of the care of 
the self and the practice of freedom can be implemented in the Muslim 
Society is in the system of marriage, which has actually been in practice 
since the birth of Islam in 7th century. This concept of practice of 
freedom has been illustrated by the Iranian anthropologist Ziba Mir-
Hosseini in her documentary Divorce Iranian Style. The film shows us 
how Iranian wives can plead for a divorce in an Islamic court, informing 
the Western audience the real agency of Muslim wives who can make 
an appeal for a separation of an unhappy marriage, which in Islamic law 
is called fasah (divorce made by an appeal of the wife), not talaq 
(divorce made by an appeal of the husband). This example, as one of 
thousands of divorce cases in Muslim community around the world, 
demonstrates how the actually practice of freedom is implemented in 
Islam. The actual practices of freedom in Islamic society are totally 
different from those propagandized by the Christian missionaries and by 
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their half-baked experts in some Western media, such as in Islam a 
husband can divorce his wife by saying “I divorce you three times.” The 
practice of freedom had been implemented much earlier in Islam than in 
the West. I will return to this standpoint of my argument in the 
concluding section of the paper when I deal with the possibility of 
Islamic feminism.  
 
Section 4 
 
The “Turban movement” of Turkish politics in 1980s marked the 
debate between the practice of veiling and the concept of modernity. 
This section, which is mainly based on Nilüfer Göle‟s (1996) The 
Forbidden Modern, discusses whether the two issues can be 
reconciled.  
Göle‟ approach to issues of veiling and modernity is theoretical, 
originating from the question of meaning rather than from a relationship 
of causality, derived from the hermeneutic tradition in social sciences. 
According to Göle, the Islamic veiling movement can embrace two 
distinct modes of action; one associates with political Islam and the 
other with cultural Islam. The political Islam aims at defending Islamic 
identity and independence against Western imperialism.  It is a top-to-
bottom system. On the other hand, the cultural Islam aims to protect 
Islam from the loss of its sacredness. In this case it is the individuals, 
community, not the state, who play a major role. It does not seize the 
political power. The Turkish veiling movement belongs to the cultural 
movement, because it is nonpolitical in the broader sense.  
In her study of the female university students‟ attitude toward 
veiling in 1987, Göle (1996) shows that veiling is not a reactionary 
phenomenon against the modernity as long as the notion modernity is 
not defined as the attitude to secularization, locating human body under 
the aesthetic and command of human willpower, which impoverishes 
sexuality by way of increasing submission of the human body to the 
spheres of science and secularization. For modern Turkish women, 
veiling in nontraditional styles is phenomenon of metropolitan cities. 
They choose to cover themselves by their own wills, not by 
enforcements by male family members, the impact of rural traditionalism 
or effects of religious education. In this case they have distanced 
themselves from their parents and traditional Muslims in many respects. 
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They commit themselves by returning to the source, but they consider 
themselves enlightened and intellectual.  
The differences among the various styles of veiling represent the 
distinction between traditional people and modern Islamic young 
women. These young women are active, self-asserting and modernist. 
Therefore, it is less compatible with the social practice of these women 
to say that “Although women assume that they are not objects thanks to 
their veils, in fact the very act of veiling per se expresses the visual 
privilege of men” (Göle, 1996: 136), presupposing that veiling shapes 
the intersection of political ideology and the power relations between the 
sexes. She thus approaches the concept of veiling and modernity 
through macro and micro levels, namely, the conceptual level in which 
there is a combination between Islam and modernity and the concept of 
individualism, which emerges from personality of women‟s own choice.  
Consequently, the two issues to some extent can be reconciled as she 
writes “when the system of meaning embedded within the Islamic 
movements is taken as the main theme of inquiry, it becomes possible 
to move from a macro-level analysis of historical modernism to a micro-
level explication of the everyday experiences of individuals” (Göle, 
1996: 131).  
Veiling is a modernity phenomenon, not a fundamentalist 
movement. It contributes to positioning women in the modern world and 
at the same time serves them with the right identity. It is a type of 
practices of freedom. The (colorful) veil protects them against Western 
abstract hegemony. The veil is for sacredness not for aesthetic or 
rights. This is due to the fact that although the veil conceals the 
departure of the Muslim women to the outside world, they can be 
outside by reminding themselves that they belong to Muslim sphere. 
This approach to modernity is different from the Western modernity:  
“which was bred according to the premises of the 
Enlightenment and industrial civilization, transformed 
communitarian relations which have been molded by the 
religious and traditional beliefs and, eventually produced a 
heterogeneous, differentiated, and pluralistic social structure 
that contributed to the formation of rational and positivist 
values, in which the roles of women either can be neglected 
or are at stake. The Turkish modernity, on the other hand, 
refused to recognize autonomous spheres in the market and 
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civil society and was based on the state authoritarianism” 
(Göle, 1996: 132, italic mine).  
The Turkish modernity is not built upon the innovative forces of 
civil society, but it is a project of civilization by which the local patterns 
and traditional values are rejected in order to seek new code of 
behavior. For example, within the radical movement, a new, urban, 
educated Muslim has emerged. The Muslim social actors enter through 
the Islamist gate, resulting in an interaction between veiling and 
modernity, which legitimizes Muslim identity and empowers Muslims as 
political agents of historical and cultural change. The veiled body of 
Muslim women attempts to resist against Westernization. But this does 
not imply that Islam stands against modernity; instead, “it acts as a 
compass of life and as a means of management with modern society” 
(Göle, 1996: 138).  
Section 5 
The aim of this section is to discuss the issue of feminism 
and Islam, particularly in relation to the works of Leila Ahmed‟s 
Women and Gender in Islam (1992) and Amina Wadud‟s Qur’an 
and Woman (1999). Ahmed‟s approach to feminism is based on 
the concept of mutual learning in which there are aspects of 
Islamic culture, particularly the traditional Arab culture that needs 
to be adjusted to modernity like other cultures in most parts of the 
world. One example of the cultural injustices that still have 
embodied the Arab traditional culture is the treatment of women in 
terms of marriage, share of household responsibilities, and 
education. 
Ahmed (1992) argues that Islam needs a redefinition and reform 
in treating women in accordance with the development and civilization, 
because some practices of the traditional Islam are no longer relevant 
to the social contexts of the present. We need a reinterpretation of the 
Qur‟an, because it is flexible, and contextual; this is due to the fact that 
the Qur‟an itself “consists mainly of broad, general propositions chiefly 
of an ethical nature, rather than specific legalistic formulations” (Ahmed, 
1992: 88). An example of this new interpretation is the reference made 
to the polygamy, which in the past was practiced by Muhammad, who 
“was the judge for his community and the interpreter of divine 
revelation” (Ahmed, 1992: 88) at the time in the context of war, namely, 
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the battle of Uhud (625), which made many Muslim women become 
widows. Some Muslim men have misused this history for the present 
context. In fact, the basic principle of marriage in Islam is monogamy, 
as it is explicitly stated in the Qur‟an: 
Marry women of your choice, two, or three, or four, but if ye 
fear that ye shall not be able to deal justly (with them), the 
only one, or (a captive) that your right hands posses. That 
will be more suitable, to prevent you from doing injustice (Q 
4:3). 
The other social practices should also be approached from a modern 
perspective, not a historically based paradigm. For example, women 
also have equality in terms education, which now have made them able 
to enter “all the professions, from teaching and nursing to medicine, law 
and engineering” (Ahmed, 1992: 241). In fact, Ahmed also argues that 
the fact that there is self-determination among the Muslim society has 
been practiced by the 8th century Sufi saint Rabi‟ah al-Adawiyah. 
Although Ahmed does not expect feminism as defined by the Western 
liberalism, she proposes that there has to be practices of freedom by 
Muslim women as it has been practiced and embedded in cultures and 
religions, since self is formulated according to these two domains. This 
is compatible with the Islamic concept of life, because the Qur‟an itself 
is egalitarian. 
Closely in line with Ahmed‟s approach to issue of feminism is Wadud‟s 
exploration of the egalitarian nature of the Qur‟an. Using hermeneutic 
and holistic approaches, Wadud (1999) proposes a reinterpretation of 
the Qur‟an, making it more transparent and relevant to the new 
contexts. She does not oppose the contents of the Qur‟an but 
reinterprets it and at the same time keeps its spirit, which can be 
applied to the collective level. Through the hermeneutic technique, 
Wadud attempts to identify the universals and the particulars in the 
Qur‟an. Wadud argues that despite the fact that there are Qur‟anic 
verses, which speak using the female referents, they do not necessarily 
mean that men are excluded and vice versa, since the Qur‟an itself is 
for both sexes- it is gendered-bias free. 
Wadud‟s approach to feminism, although she does not like the 
label, focuses on the practices of freedom, working on the limits of the 
traditions and using all kinds of possible techniques including writing as 
she has proven it herself. She challenges the misinterpretations and 
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misreading of the Qur‟an, some of which have led to the oppression of 
women. Instead she prefers an updated interpretation of the Qur‟an that 
leads to social justice in which “women would have full access to 
economic, intellectual, and political participation, and men would value 
and therefore participate fully in home and child care for a more 
balanced and fair society” (Wadud, 1999: 103).5 As a result, feminism 
and Islam can go together. I will elaborate this statement in the final 
section below.    
 
Conclusion 
 
The aim of this section is to argue by answering the question 
whether there is or not the possibility of Islamic feminism. My argument 
is derived from the standpoint that Islam does not regard women as 
second-class human beings. In Qur‟an no mention about misogyny is 
made. There might have been some inequalities due to cultures in 
which Islam has been embedded in them so that it is not always easy to 
differentiate between the True Islam and the aspects of social life 
produced by culture, such as Saudi Arabia, where women are asked to 
wear abbayyas (floor length veils). Such excessive forms of these kinds 
of dress are not mentioned in Islam. Islam requires women to wear a 
veil, not abbayyas, for their own safety, but if a woman chooses not to 
wear it, it is her choice and it is between her and God. What 
misunderstood is the practice of abbayyas; it is usually interpreted 
negatively by some halve-baked experts in the Western academia and 
the media because of their hatred and confusion between Islam and the 
Arab culture. One cannot equate Islam with the Arabs, who make up 
only about 20 percents of more or less 1.5 billion world‟s Muslim  
population.  Some Western media and academics often say that Islam 
discriminates against women, and that women have no power or 
authority. The media and these “experts” do not acknowledge that the 
Prophet Mohammad himself was one of the greatest reformers for 
                                                 
5
This proposal of balancing the social justice between men and women 
is in fact not new at all; in some Muslim countries such as Malaysia and 
Indonesia it has been practiced for decades. For the study of women in some 
countries in Southeast Asia, see Gonsoulin, Margaret. 2005. „The Islamic 
Frontier: Islam and Gender Equity in Southeast Asia.‟ Hawwa, 3 (1): 9-39.  
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women.6 In fact, Islam is probably the only religion that formally teaches 
women‟s rights and finds ways to protect them. Islam allows women to 
have the right to be educated and the right to participate in political, 
economical, and social activities in their community. This attitude of 
Islam toward women has been reflected by some modern Islamic 
feminists (see e.g. Wadud, 1999).  
Islam acknowledges gender equality. For example, Muslim 
women were given the right to vote much earlier than those of the West 
such as the U.S., which did not allow women to vote until 1919, but the 
Western media and academics often fail to inform their people about 
this fact. While they are so concerned about negative and discriminatory 
images about Islamic women, they fail to remind themselves that there 
are several Islamic countries (Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and 
Turkey) that have had female heads of states. In contrast, most 
Western nations such as the United States, which condemns Islamic 
countries for their oppression of women, have yet to see a non-white, 
male president, let alone a female president. In Indonesia7 we always 
have women ministers in the cabinet; on the other hand, in the West 
including the Netherlands even the women professors are as rare as 
Sumatran tigers8. But the western academics keep campaigning that 
Islam is oppressed to women. They can see a very small “fly” far away, 
but they cannot see a very big “elephant” in front of their eyes. No 
Western academics including the feminists have written a single article 
in protest against the exploitation of women at the “red light districts”.  
                                                 
6
In my search for the literature on Western women liberation at the 
libraries of the University of Amsterdam, I found that most books about women 
liberation in the West had been published since 1980s, despite the fact that the 
university was founded in 1632. In Islam liberation of women has been 
practiced since 6
th
 century. It is just the West, who has not managed to 
understand it.   
7
For the women‟s movements in Indonesia, see Anwar, Etin. 2003.' 
“Directed” Women‟s Movements in Indonesia: Social and Political Agency from 
Within.‟ Hawwa, 2 (1): 89-112. 
8
At present the number of Sumatran tigers around the world including 
in captives is only a few hundreds. Because it is totally irrelevant, I never intend 
to compare women to tigers.  
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Islam totally eradicates any perspective that distinguishes men 
and women, particularly in relation to humankind as the Qur‟an itself 
revealed to oppose the practice of jahiliah:9 
When news is brought to one of them, of (the birth of) a 
female (child), his face darkens, and he is filled with inward 
grief! With shame does he hide himself from his people, 
because of the bad news he has had! Shall he retain it on 
(sufferance and) contempt, or bury it in the ground? Ah! 
What an evil (choice) they decide on (Q 16:58-59).10 
In the Qur‟an and prophet traditions there are verses that both women 
and men are obligatory to study, to go school for their education, for 
example, in the first verse: Read in the name of thy Lord and cherisher 
Who created (Q 96: 1). In Islam both women and men are encouraged 
to search for knowledge as far as and as much as they want to have it. 
The tradition points out “search for knowledge even to China.” God 
rewards all intellectuals, not only men but also women, who remember 
Him and think of how He creates the earth and the sky, leading them to 
unravel the secrets of the universe:  
Never will I suffer to be lost the work of any of you, be he 
male or female, ye are members, one of another (Q 3:195). 
This verse presupposes that women can also learn whatever interests 
them and apply their knowledge for the benefit of humankind. There 
have been several ideal examples of women who have become the 
references for men, such as the prophet wife, Aisyah, who was well 
                                                 
9
Jahiliah is the attitude that hates women; in the past it even had led to 
the killings of female babies- infanticide, as soon as they were born, by burying 
them alive. According to Ahmed (1992: 42) Islamists‟ argument about 
condemning this attitude seems simplistic and inaccurate. Her arguments 
which are full of very low modality- seem, appear, maybe, probably, perhaps, 
suggest- are accurate? The Qur‟an condemns even “modern jahiliah”, such as 
the exploitation of women in the Netherlands and Thailand.   
10
As a believer, in defending my argument that there is a possibility of 
Islamic feminism, since Islam is egalitarian, I cannot avoid making some 
references to some verses of the Qur‟an or prophet traditions. In this paper I 
have quoted the Qur‟anic verses mainly from „Abdullah Yusul „Ali (1946) The 
Holy Qur’an: Text, Translation and Commentary. Cambridge, USA: The Murray 
Printing Company.  
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known as a great critic, and the prophet himself acknowledged her 
competence as confirmed by some ulamas (Muslim clerics) that the 
Prophet once said: 
Take a half of your religious knowledge from al-Humaira (Aisyah).11 
From social practice perspectives, there are a lot of examples that show 
us that Islamic feminism has always been possible. Even in the 
classical Islam period feminism existed. For example, Sayyidah 
Sakinah, the daughter of Al-Husain bin Ali bin Abi Thalib, and Al-
Syaikhah Syuhrah, who have been called Fakhr Al-Nisa (the pride of 
women) represented early Islamic feminists. Al-Syaikhah Syuhrah was 
one of the teachers of Imam Syafi'i, the greatest scholar of Islamic 
jurisprudence, today practiced by the majority of Muslims around the 
world. In addition, Imam Abu Hayyan noted three women who were the 
teachers of that school12, namely, Mu'nisat Al-Ayyubiyah, Syamiyat Al-
Taimiyah, and Zainab. In Islamic history, there were many other women 
who were recognized as great scholars such as Al-Khansa' and Rabi'ah 
al-Adawiyah; the latter has been referred to by several modern feminists 
(see e.g. Vintges, 2003; 2004 and Ahmed, 1992). 
In her approach to feminism as a multiple belonging, Cooke 
(2001) listed several names of modern Islamic feminists such as Assia 
Djebar and Fatimah Mernissi, who take advantage of how to build up 
multiple self-positioning identities made available for them by Islam. 
Although their positions as Islamic feminists are debatable, I would 
argue that they belong to the feminist group, because they all fight for 
equality and freedom, which have been neglected in some Muslim 
societies. Their positions as Islamic feminists cannot be categorized the 
same as those of the Egyptian women‟s mosques movement 
participants, because these women are not scientifically involved in 
fighting for equality. I do not think many of them produce scientific works 
in which their voices are understood and used by others; they are 
                                                 
11
The Prophet Mahammad used to address his wife, Aisyah, with the 
label Al-Humaira, meaning “the pink cheek”. This was due the fact that Aisyah‟s 
cheeks were always beautifully pink.   
12
The notion school used when talking about Islamic jurisprudence 
refers to the method Muslims practice Islam in their daily life, such as 
Hambaliyah and Syafi‟iyah called madhabs.   
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frequently involved in limited settings, such as mosques. If we do not 
accept Fatimah Mernissi, Zaynab al-Ghazali and other Muslim women 
scholars, technically fighting for equalities such as writing, as belonging 
to the feminist group, then feminism does not exist in a universal 
context. Or perhaps, feminism needs to revisit its epistemology.     
There are, of course, many other examples that I cite to support 
the possibility of Islamic feminism, but since the space is very limited we 
have to conclude that women, to quote what the prophet says, are 
Syaqa'iq Al-Rijal (women are the siblings of men); therefore, their 
positions in the community are equal. If there some particulars that 
result in a distinction between the two sexes, it is merely the function of 
their main tasks (such as women must not pray or fast during their 
menstruation) which are obliged by God to each of the gender and 
which need to be admitted, but it does not necessarily mean that men 
have more freedoms than women. God rewards some people more 
than others and that is God‟s right, not to be debated. 
In short, the answer to the question whether there is or is not the 
possibility of Islamic feminism depends on how the West treats and 
judges it. If Islamic feminism is steered according to the Western 
liberation, such as exploiting women by calling them “social workers” as 
it has long been legalized by the Dutch government, my answer is not 
possible. Islam will never accept such an incorrect practice of freedom. 
But if feminism is manifested in accordance with positive ethics, norms, 
morals, and fair practices of freedom the answer is absolutely 
affirmative. There is always a possibility of Islamic feminism. 
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